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Immigration, Integration, and Public
Opinion in the European Union
Andreas Jozwiak
Trinity University

Abstract
The politics of immigration and integration pose significant and interrelated challenges for the continued growth and success of the European Union. This paper explores
that connection by means of a literature review and a regression analysis.While the literature
explores in depth each issue separately, I conclude that public opinion moves in the same
direction; that is, a person that views the EU favorably is most likely going to view immigration positively. This is for a number of reasons, the most important of which relates to how
citizens perceive their national identity, as both integration and immigration are threats upon
national sovereignty. I find that variables such as a nation’s ‘foreign policy’ tradition, education, and left/right positioning are also important factors, while most other socioeconomic
data are not significant.
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As the European Union has expanded and brought prosperity to the continent, both
member states and the EU have to contend with immigration to the community from
the East and South. But because of the structure of the EU, it has to negotiate the internal
politics of deeper integration to solve these problems. As EU integration has evolved, elites,
whose priorities have differed from those of citizens, have to a great extent controlled integration and immigration (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005; Lahav, 2004; Philip, 1994).
Nevertheless, the way in which public opinion shapes national and European level politics is
very important because of the interplay between national and supranational policy making
institutions. Furthermore, there are important connections between public opinion on immigration and integration. Both issues can be seen as encroachments on national sovereignty
and identity. Immigration (people coming from the outside) is ideologically inextricably
related to European integration (people from outside ruling over the nation). Immigration,
therefore, highlights the challenge faced by European Union integration in terms of the
extent to which the EU can become truly one unit (Lahav, 2004; Hooghe & Marks, 2004).
Using both literature and public opinion data, this paper will demonstrate that the factors
(economic, cultural, historical, and political) that determine citizen’s attitudes towards integration are similar to those that guide their decision on immigration.
Institutional Interplay and Integration
Because of the way the European Union is structured, there is a ‘democracy deficit’
that is endemic of its supranational structure. Only one branch, the European Parliament,
with relatively little power, is an elected body. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) and Lahav
(2004) argue that elites, who have controlled European Union integration under the Monet
method, and the public disagree significantly on immigration issues. European citizens, by
and large, did not have a say in or a role in the creation of an integrated Europe. Elites in the
EU have had significant control on immigration policy and have liberalized it. These ‘Eurocrats’ are able to take a much more liberal stance on immigration because they do not face
electoral pressure in the way national legislatures and administrations are held accountable
to decisions made (Luedtke, 2008). The European Parliament can vote on many decisions,
but because of the consensus-seeking nature of the Union, policy makers are often not held
accountable to public opinion. In addition, the democracy deficit in the EU does not confer legitimacy upon the EU’s institutions in the eyes of the people, and thus they may feel
threatened by its encroachment. Overall, the EU has been the liberalizing force in European
politics, fighting over time, for example, for free movement of labor and integration among
other political objectives, while national governments are keen on blocking unwanted immigration and preserving some core elements of their power, such as foreign policy. According
to Philip (1994), the EU seems to be winning this battle and will continue to win, as successive waves of integration have prompted national governments to cede power to the EU.
The most recent example of this is in the Eurozone crisis, where the rhetoric surrounding
the crisis has called for deeper fiscal integration.
The connector between attitudes towards immigration and integration is the power
struggle and dynamics of the relationship between individual nations and the EU. No common immigration policy exists among European Union states, although many suggest that
this is necessary to secure borders (Zimmerman, 1995; Huntoon, 1998). Most nations have
given the EU control over issues such as the environment, and at first wanted to give the EU
control over immigration, but most nations feel their identity being threatened if they do
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not have control over issues such as VAT (Value Added Tax) and immigration (Lahav, 2004).
Another important issue relevant to immigration and integration debates concerns
the granting of citizenship, which remains firmly in the hands of individual member states.
While member states can grant citizenship, the free movement policy of the EU dictates
that these newly minted citizens can move to another EU nation where they are granted
social rights (Philip 1994). This fact further politicizes immigration because member states,
as a result of the Schengen agreement, rely upon one another to safeguard their external
borders. This first became a problem with the entry of Greece, Spain, and Portugal in 1981
and 1986 respectively, with EU citizens worrying about an influx of Spaniards and other
immigrants into their countries with more generous welfare states (Philip, 1994). This lends
itself to be compared to the eastern expansion of the EU in 2004 and similar concerns about
immigration from the newly annexed East. Finally, related to citizenship is the concept of
a national and European identity. Public perception of European identity is still very weak
compared to national identity. The fact remains that the relationship between “citizenship”
and “nation-state” remains much stronger than the relationship between “EU” and “citizenship” (Odmalm, 2007).This encapsulates the great debates over citizenship, immigration, and
integration.
Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration and Integration
There are two main areas in the literature that researchers refer to when discussing
attitudes towards the EU and immigration. They are cultural and national identity (and the
associated problems of racism and prejudice), and economics. These are interrelated and
are summarized in Quillian (1995; 1996) in Kessler and Freeman (2005) who finds that,
“perceived threat, understood as a function of economic conditions and of the size of the
subordinate group relative to the dominant group, is an important determinant of variations
in prejudice” (p. 828). Therefore, we would expect cultures that are isolationist, such as the
United Kingdom, combined with a poor perception of the economic situation would engender unfavorable opinion of the EU and immigrants.
A poor or deteriorating economic situation is a cause typically understood to lead
toward protectionist measures and anti-immigrant sentiment. According to Kessler and Freeman (2005), generally, in poorer economic conditions the public tends to be more protectionist and display more anti-immigrant tendencies. In addition, concerns about national
unemployment or pressure on the host country’s social tension and welfare system may drive
public opinion against immigrants (Lahav, 2004; Philip, 1994; Kessler & Freeman, 2005).
For example, Mayda (2004) finds that low skilled workers in high GDP nations are more
apt to be more anti-immigration, as there is a perception of competition. However, there
is a crucial difference between appearance and reality, as most research points to the fact
that perception of increasing unemployment rather than actual changes in unemployment
is more important in swaying public opinion (Kessler and Freedman, 2005, Lahav, 2004;
Zimmermann, 1995). In fact, some studies, such as Kessler and Freeman (2005) and Lahav
(2004) failed to show any connection between immigration and a decrease in employment.
Huntoon (1998) rightfully argues that EU nations need immigrants to fill shortages in lower
paying jobs. On the other hand, more trade within the European community, according to
Masso (2009), tends to be a trigger that promotes more favorable attitudes towards European
integration. This is one of the best tools the European Union has at its disposal to foster
favorable views of the EU, as trade and improved economic performance is one of the true
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benefits of European integration.
Much of the literature on feelings towards immigrants and deeper integration also
points to a couple of intangible factors that matter in constructing public opinion (Mayda,
2004; McLaren, 2002). This intangible is a perceived threat to a nation’s identity and culture.
The research here is divided in two areas: the first discusses the creation within a nation of
in- and out-groups of society, where the out-groups are treated with hostility (de Vreese &
Boomgaarden, 2005; Kessler & Freeman, 2005). This could be attributed to high concentrations of immigrants in a neighborhood or city, especially in societies where immigration
levels have outpaced national growth, a common predicament of many EU member states
(Lahav, 2004; Gang et al., 2002; Kessler & Freeman, 2005; Zimmerman, 1995). The second
group of research focuses on the perceived cultural threat to a nation not stemming from
threats to individuals lives, but to the nation as a whole, and is a result of attachment to
groups, identities, and nationalism (McLaren, 2002; Lahav, 2004). Hooghe and Marks (2004)
raise interesting questions in terms of identity creation and how it affects attitudes towards
both integration and immigration. They propose that how individuals construct their identity is the determining factor. For example, their perceptions of national identity as exclusive
or inclusive along with attitudes towards multiculturalism are most important.These feelings
and the need to create strong sense of national or regional identity that shield them from
the outside might stem from Europeans’ eurocentrism and long held sense of inferiority that
Peter O’Brien discusses (2009). The relationship between public opinion on immigration
and integration is clear – people who feel threatened by the outside by either immigrants or
an encroaching power will naturally tend to be more aggressively supportive of their national
government, which is closer to home.
Additionally, research on integration and immigration has also dealt with national-level
issues, such as politics and history as factors. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) create a measure
they call a foreign policy tradition that will help determine whether or not countries will
be supportive of the EU. They prove that Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have
traditionally been insular and will therefore not support the EU or be very favorable towards
an influx of immigration. This is noteworthy especially for the United Kingdom, as their
wariness of immigration is contradictory to the economic necessity of letting in new immigrants (Haynes, 2011). On the other hand, France, the Netherlands, and Italy will look to
the EU for a voice, security, and prosperity because they have a tradition of openness. The
Dutch in particular have been accepting of supranational institutions and therefore tend to
be more europositive.
Previous research on European integration and immigration issues deals with the role
national politics play in shaping decisions and opinion. The effects of these sentiments are
exhibited mainly in the right/left divide of the political spectrum and the resurgence and
growing popularity of right wing parties (Kessler & Freeman, 2005; Lubbers et al., 2002;
Hooghe & Marks, 2002). This attests that immigration is a major issue that has been overlooked by the main parties and thus is being carried to the center stage by right wing parties,
usually identified as fringe parties, who are usually both anti-immigrant and anti-EU (de
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2005). Furthermore, their rising power suggests that immigration
and integration are huge issues within the EU. For example, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993)
point out the case of Denmark in 1989, where Euroskeptic parties made significant electoral
gains, and therefore the Maastricht Treaty, the founding treaty of the EU, was voted down in
a referendum. A more recent reflection of euroskepticism and anti-integration sentiment is
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/11
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in the European Parliamentary (EP) elections of 2009, in which a new group of euroskeptic
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) came into parliament and formed the fourth
largest grouping in the EP, the European Conservatives and Reformists Group. In short, parties in power do make a difference in constructing (or mirroring) public sentiment on EU
integration. This group is both conservative (and thus also relatively anti-immigration) and
anti-EU, which shows that on the right side of the spectrum, there is a cohesive ideology that
opposes threats to national sovereignty and identity from the outside.
Hooghe and Marks (2002) see these politics of integration through a new left/right
split in politics. The authors write that parties have been challenged as European politics
have become a major issue in the domestic political sphere. They first look at the traditional
Left/Right split in domestic parties, and propose an inverted U model in which centrist
parties tend to be pro-integration, while parties towards either extreme have been Euroskeptic. However, the authors also look beyond the traditional left/right split and examine
what they call the “green/alternative/libertarian” and “traditional/authoritarian/nationalist”
poles, in which issues such as lifestyle, the environment, nationalism, and immigration are
important. Again trying to predict support for integration by measuring a party’s proximity
to either pole, they found that the strongest correlation was found between Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalist (or TAN) parties, who are anti-immigration, were also most
against EU integration, while Green/Alternative/ Libertarian (or GAL) parties tend to be
more pro-integrationist, though much less strongly so. They explain that these parties are
more issue-driven and they are more reserved in their support because of the democracy
deficit in the EU. Finally, they argue that domestic parties are constrained by the same issues
on the national and EU level and that European politics have, in a way, become domestic.
Case Study: Immigration and Integration in Southern Europe
As is evident, the public opinion on immigration and integration is closely related.
However, the arguments made for this are on a rather abstract level, and a close examination
of a European Union member state, such as Spain, can help to underscore some of these
points. Spain is an interesting case study because it is europositive and a large receiver of
immigrants. Since its accession to the European Union in 1986, it has benefitted massively
from the huge amount of EU structural funding that has flowed into Spain. This investment,
according to Oscar Martinez Tapia (2011), has led Spain to being one of the more europositive nations. Europositivism does not necessarily translate to support for deeper integration,
but it signals openness to European institutions. This, however, seems to be strongly related
to money; and Oscar Tapia (2011) worried that in the next few years, as Spain becomes a net
contributor to the EU, support for the EU would erode. At the same time, Spain is also enduring one of the worst economic crises in history; it has problems with its debt but also has
underlying structural problems such as youth unemployment at over 40%. Another speaker
on immigration, Joacquin Arango (2011), argued that Spanish culture has also historically
been open to immigration. This is reflected in their legal system where immigrants, once
they are registered, have access to social benefits and welfare. In addition, Spanish immigration policy is far more liberal than overall EU immigration legislation as it provides welfare benefits to undocumented immigrants. Interestingly, although one would expect public
opinion in a crisis to turn against immigrants and the outside world (i.e., the EU), Spanish
opinion has remained relatively unchanged on immigration. Finally, public opinion on the
right-wing, where euroskepticism and anti-immigration sentiment tend to be found, does
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not have a true outlet in Spanish politics, as there is only one (mainstream) conservative party.
This is what Koopmans et al. (2005) refers to as an opportunity structure, where the political embodiment of anti-immigrant sentiment, for example, is constrained (but also given a
launchpad) by extant political and social structures.
Spanish public opinion seems to be fairly contradictory – poor economic situations
do not usually coincide with openness to foreigners and the European Union. While this
would seem to indicate that factors of immigration and integration attitudes do not always
align, it shows that national tradition (which encompasses Europositivism and tolerance for
immigration), in this case, is a stronger explanatory variable than economic performance
in guiding citizens’ opinions. Their national tradition was born out of a particular context;
Spain for a long time was a net receiver of European Union funding. However, their tradition of tolerance, not only of immigrants, comes from a long history of changes in ethnic
groups, religions, and political control, and therefore national tradition can be said to have a
strong influence on Spain’s overall views on integration and immigration.
Spain is in many ways special and in contrast with Italy (and possibly most of Europe),
where the economic downturn has created mistrust in the national government and European institutions for their inability to solve the crisis. Furthermore, Italy has had a very
conservative government and has many right-wing parties, giving voice to those who oppose European integration and immigration. In addition, Italy hardly can be said to have an
‘immigration policy,’ despite its position on the Mediterranean. Roughly every four years it
grants amnesty to immigrants already living in the country, thus providing no incentive for
legal entry. According to Flavia Piperno (2011), a student at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy extends no social rights for immigrants, does not have an integration
plan for them, and has problems with anti-immigrant violence. In addition, they have over
time become more and more euroskeptic, as their confidence in European institutions has
gradually decreased. Italy, today, exemplifies the expected outcome of an economic crisis:
anti-immigrant sentiment and a more protectionist outlook.
Public Opinion Data and Immigration and Integration
In the next part of the paper, I use Eurobarometer public opinion data from 2008 in an
attempt to demonstrate how interrelated attitudes towards integration and immigration are.
The dependent variable in this model is a question from the Eurobarometer survey which
asks, “For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by (NATONALITY) Government, or made jointly with the EU?” Immigration is one of these subcategories of
the question. This question is useful as it connects the issues of immigration and integration. The independent variables in the study include country level variables such immigrant
populations within member states, socio-economic variables, and questions on the perception citizens have of the EU that are typical of integration studies. This model will primarily show how related the issues are by showing how integration and immigration variables
guide citizen’s opinions in the same direction.
Procedure
The study is based on the Eurobarometer survey, which surveys Europeans on a biannual basis on a range of issues.This study uses a Eurobarometer that focuses on globalization,
the European Parliament, and further EU integration. This and all Eurobarometer surveys
were also administered in Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey and Turkish Cyprus among the other
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/11
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EU member states. In order to produce results that accurately reflect attitudes towards EU
integration and immigration from within the community records from non-EU nations
were removed from the analysis.
Because many of these variables in the model seem similar, I took steps to ensure that
they are not misread or misleading. I addressed the issue of multicolinearity by running a
series of bivariate correlations among the independent variables to ensure that none of the
correlations was above .7, which could have indicated such a relationship and produced
skewed results.
Finally, the dependent variable in the study is bivariate; it asks people if they prefer
national (coded 1) or EU level (coded 0) decisions making on immigration issues. Because
the variable is bivariate, I ran a logistic model rather than a linear regression model. All of the
variables helped provide an explanation of what factors drive people to their beliefs about
immigration decision making.
Results
Table 1. Variables in the Equation
Variable

B

S.E.

Wald

Exp(B)

Dummy_DK

0.464

0.076

36.962

1.591

Dummy_UK

0.443

0.089

24.546

1.557

EU_image4

0.369

0.023

253.13

1.446

EU_mem_benefit2

0.288

0.043

45.83

1.334

EU_inefficient

0.265

0.036

55.345

1.303

EU_Protect

0.197

0.027

53.078

1.218

Educ_3

0.085

0.018

21.752

1.088

conservative_govt*

0.073

0.044

2.681

1.076

Unemp_financial*

0.055

0.098

0.315

1.056

LR_placement

0.036

0.008

22.3

1.037

important_immig*

0.033

0.064

0.264

1.033

perc_nonEU_immig

0.018

0.004

19.877

1.018

sitaution_financial

-0.16

0.026

39.29

0.852

unemp_2

-0.308

0.283

1.185

0.735

dummy_NL

-0.284

0.08

12.719

0.752

*

dummy_France
-0.74
0.092
64.906
0.477
* Sig (p-value) >.05
The author’s calculations of data from Papacostas, A. Eurobarometer 70.1: October-November 2008.

The dependent variable in this study was bivariate and consequently run through a
logistic model. The model yielded statistics that helped determine whether or not the regression model was valid. The Omnibus Chi-Square for this model was 1332.214, and was
statistically significant (p = .000). The model also returned two R-squared figures. The Cox
& Snell R Squared produced a value of .078, while the Nagelkerke R Squared returned a
higher value at .106.This means the model explains 7.8% or 10.6% of the variation.The very
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high, statistically significant Chi-Square for this model (as well as its significance) indicates
the model is relatively strong in explaining why people choose national or EU decision making on immigration issues.
For each of the variables in the model the findings are interpreted in terms of the likelihood that a change in the dependent variable will occur as a result of any given independent
variable. For example, I used the exp(B) in the model (for educ_3, a scale of education, with
higher education levels coded in descending order, 1.088), subtracted 1 from it (.088), and
multiplied it by 100 to obtain a percentage, 8.8%. Therefore, with increasing levels of education, people will, with each level of education (high school, some college, college), be 8.8%
more likely to support EU legislation.
Findings/Discussion
The stronger predictors of a policy-making level preference in this study were the
national level variables (dummy_DK/NL/UK/France). People living in Denmark and the
United Kingdom, for example, were 59.1 and 55.7 percent more likely to support nationallevel legislation on immigration than the EU ‘average,’ while citizens of the Netherlands and
France were 24.8 and 52.3 percent less likely to support national legislation. These results
point to the fact that ‘national traditions’ are very important in determining people’s preferences on policy making. This is also revealing of a nation’s attitudes towards immigration.
The United Kingdom and Denmark have been slightly less accepting of immigration and
thus would want to control it with national legislation, while more ‘liberal’ immigrant receiving states prefer more liberal EU legislation.
Socioeconomic variables (unemp_2, unemp_financial, financial_situation) in this model
did not factor significantly into people’s decision-making processes. This is not surprising
because they relate to a person’s actual situation, and not to their or their nation’s perceived
economic situation, which, according to the literature, would explain their preferences more
clearly. The only significant variable was education, whereby a lower education level led to
increasing inclination to support national legislation. This was very significant, as it shows
that, by and large, more education, which presumably means more exposure to the EU and
knowledge of its institution, will lead people to be more accepting of integration and immigration.
Finally, the variables relating to support for the European Union were all significant.
The variables measuring support for the Union were: EU_image4 (a four point scale of a
positive or negative view of the EU), EU_mem_ben_2 (a yes/no question asking if they think
EU accession has benefitted their country), EU_protect (asking if citizens felt the EU protected them), and EU_inefficient (asking if they felt the EU was efficient). In all cases, responses
that related to a sense of confidence in the European Union translated to greater support for
European Union level legislation on immigration, while a lack of confidence consistently
characterized a preference for national legislation.
Another major factor in a person’s decision making was their placement on the left to
right spectrum. This measure was on a 1 to 9 scale, and with each increase in unit of conservatism (as the scale moves to 9), the likelihood of a person supporting national legislation
increased by 3.7%. While this may seem small, the overall increase in likelihood that they
support national decisions was 33.3% from position one to position nine. This is relevant
because it not only points towards conservative or liberal opinions on integration, but it also
is an important explanatory variable for attitudes on immigration issues.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/11
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Two variables were created with data entered from outside sources. The first one, conservative_govt, was meant to determine whether or not having a conservative government
in power nationally affected citizen’s preferences, but it seemed not to have an effect, as its
explanatory power was statistically insignificant. The other, perc_nonEU_immig, recorded the
percentage of non EU citizens in each EU member state, was statistically significant in the
model. This variable shows that with every one percentage unit increase in immigrants from
outside the EU, we can expect a 1.8% increase in citizen’s favoring national legislation. This
largely agrees with the literature that large immigrant populations tend to turn national
public opinion against immigration as a whole.
Conclusion
In conclusion, immigration and integration can be seen as threats on a nation’s culture
and sovereignty from the outside, and in some way change the nature of the traditional
European nation-state. The European Union has been trying to forge a “European” rather
than a national identity and its growth has led to the weakening of the nation’s government.
Similarly, immigration from outside the European Union is seen as a threat economically
and culturally. Citizens are worried about the strain immigrants put on the social system and
the jobs they could be taking from nationals. Additionally, immigrants change the face of the
nation and they can be perceived to threaten the traditional social fabric and culture.
Although this model cannot predict people’s attitudes on intangible factors such as how
a person views his or her national identity, it attempts to shed some light on the relationship
between people’s personal characteristics and their views on integration and immigration.
This statistical model and the literature done on public opinion on immigration and integration exemplify how the many factors that play into people’s attitudes towards immigration
and integration are, by and large, the same and point in the same direction on both issues.
For example, higher levels of education relate to higher levels of tolerance for immigrants
(because they are no longer a threat at a high skill level) and more knowledge (or support)
of the EU. Other factors include national traditions, socioeconomic variables (though, as the
model and research agree, this has more to do with a perception rather than reality), and a
person’s political standpoint and identity. This connection between the two topics is highly
relevant as the European Union faces unprecedented challenges as a result of the Eurozone
financial crisis and external factors, such as the Arab Spring.The European Union, as a result
of its structure, will forever have to contend with the politics of immigration and integration,
and public opinion (and thereby democracy) is likely to play a larger role in determining the
future of the Union.
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